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The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants
and Other Professionals
Samuel H Gruenbaum *
I. Introduction
Relying on its legislative, regulatory and enforcement authority, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) has prominently influ-
enced the accounting profession's responsibility for implementing the objectives
of the federal securities laws. While the accountant of yesteryear may have been
nothing more than a "watchdog,"' today's accountant shoulders a much greater
responsibility. 2 Although shareholder suits have contributed significantly to this
trend, in large measure it has resulted from the persistent efforts of the SEC.
Much of the SEC's influence has been exerted through disciplinary proceed-
ings under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice. 3 Rule 2(e) has been
an effective and intimidating tool for the SEC in policing accountants and their
practices. Under the rule,
[t]he Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing
or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission...
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking
in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional
conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
tion of any provision of the Federal securities laws. . . , or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
4
"Practicing before the Commission" is defined to include "the preparation of any
statement, opinion or other paper by any .. . accountant . . . filed with the
Commission . . .with the consent of such . . .accountant . . ... 5 The SEC's
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles; Associate, Loeb and Loeb; Member,
California and District of Columbia Bars; Certified Public Accountant.
I Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889); see In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., 2 Ch. 279 (1896).
2 See generally J. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (1969); D. CAUSEY, DUTIES
AND LIABILITIES OF THE CPA (1973); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: Se-
curities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247 (1980); Committee on Corporate Law & Ac-
counting, Corporate Responsibility in the Financial Accounting and Disclosure Areas. Who Makes and Who Implements
the Rules?, 34 Bus. LAW. 1979 (1979): Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52
NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977); Adams, Lessening the Legal Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037 (1977);
Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liabilio-A Ten Year Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 1205 (1974); Marinelli, The
Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 113 (1971); Kurland,
Accountant'r Legal Liability Ultramares to BarChris, 25 Bus. LAW. 155 (1969).
3 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980).
4 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1980).
5 17 C.F.R. § 201.1(g) (1980). In SEC v. Ezrine, No. 72-3161 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), "practicing before
the Commission" was defined more broadly by the court as
participating, in a representative capacity, in any administrative proceeding, investigation, or
conference concerning matters within the Commission's jurisdiction, (b) participating, in a rep-
resentative capacity, in connection with matters within the Commission's jurisdiction when it
appears or reasonably should appear that a Commission proceeding or investigation will be
instituted therewith, (c) representing any broker or dealer, investment company or investment
advisor registered or required to be registered with the Commission in connection with any
matter arising under or relating to the federal securities laws, and (d) representing or advising
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aggressive use of such proceedings in recent years6 has brought into focus several
important issues regarding rule 2(e), some peculiar to accountants and others
applicable to all professionals operating within the rule's scope.
II. Rule 2(e) Authority and the Role of Accountants
Although rule 2(e) was initially adopted in 1935, 7 its use by the Commission
remained relatively restrained until the 1970's.8 Since then, the rule's increased
use has provoked resistance and criticism from all sides,9 although the Commis-
sion thus far has been largely successful in meeting these challenges.
The most formidable challenge came in 1979 in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC.10
Touche Ross, a national accounting firm and the target of a public 2(e) proceed-
ing,"I argued that (1) the rule "had been promulgated 'without any statutory
authority' "; (2) the proceeding by the SEC had been instituted "without au-
thority of law"; and (3) "in any event, since the SEC does not constitute an
impartial forum for the adjudication of issues raised in the SEC's Rule 2(e) order,
that such administrative proceedings would deny Touche Ross due process of
any entity or person in connection with the preparation or filing of documents as may be re-
quired to be filed with the Commission under the federal securities laws.
SEC Litigation Release No. 5495 n.26 (Aug. 14, 1972).
Orders of the SEC imposing sanctions under rule 2(e) are reviewable by direct appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or the court of appeals for the circuit in which the
appellant resides or has his principal place of business. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
6 See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 281-82 n.191; Downing & Miller, The Dirtortion and
Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774 (1979). See also Gruenbaum, Clients'Frauds and Their Law-
.yers' Obligations.. A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEo. L.J. 191, 200-04 (1979).
7 SEC FIRsT ANNUAL REP. 45 (1935). As initially adopted, the rule in effect established an SEC Bar
by setting various admission requirements to practice before the Commission. These requirements were
eliminated by the 1938 amendments to the rule. Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938). Subse-
quently, the rule was amended on two more occasions. See Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24,
1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,913; Securities Act Release No. 5147
(May 10, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,064. In 1974 another amend-
ment was proposed which would have made every rule 2(e) proceeding public unless otherwise directed by
the Commission. Securities Act Release No. 5477 (Apr. 5, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,738. However, the proposal was later withdrawn, Securities Act Release No. 5572 (Mar.
4, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,533, and most rule 2(e) proceedings
continue to remain nonpublic until finally adjudicated. See In re Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80, 720 (Sept. 2, 1976), for what appears to have been the first public
rule 2(e) proceeding. Rule 2(e)(7) provides that all proceedings under the rule shall be nonpublic unless
otherwise directed by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(7)(1980).
8 See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 281-82 n.191 (accountants); In re Keating, Muething
& Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,994 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel,
C., dissenting) (attorneys).
9 Former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel repeatedly criticized the Commission's use of rule 2(e)
as a vehicle for disciplining accountants and attorneys. See In re Nielsen, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,446, at 82,883-86 (Jan. 10, 1980) (Karmel, C., dissenting) (accountants); In re
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,992-97
(July 2, 1979) (Karmel, C., dissenting) (attorneys). See also Fiflis, Current Problems ofAccountants'Responsihili-
ties to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 63-64 (1975) (the imposition of sanctions under rule 2(e) is an
"inordinate intrusion of government into professional activity"); Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Mis-
use of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774, 793 (1979) ("[t]he Commission's questionable use, and abuse,
of Rule 2(e) gives rise to serious considerations of the due process afforded the professional who is the
subject of such a proceeding, and the larger question of the proper role of the SEC in disciplining and
regulating professionals"); Bialkin, Commission's Latest 2(e) Proceeding Profoundy Disquiets Securities Bar, Nat'l
LJ., Apr. 30, 1979, at 25, col. 1; Comment, 4ttorney Liability Under SECRule 2 (e): A New Standard?, 11 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 83 (1979).
10 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
11 In re Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,720 (Sept. 2,
1976).
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law."12
Writing for the court, Judge Timbers, himself a former SEC General Coun-
sel, rejected Touche Ross's arguments and held that the Commission had acted
within its statutory authority in promulgating rule 2(e), and that disciplinary
proceedings under the rule are a proper exercise of Commission power. 13 As one
of the bases for reaching these conclusions the court stated:
The role of the accounting and legal professions in implementing the objectives of the
disclosure policy has increased in importance as the number and complexity of secur-
ities transactions has increased. By the very nature of its operations, the Commission,
with its small staff and limited resources, cannot possibly examine, with the degree of
close scrutiny required for full disclosure, each of the many financial statements
which are filed. Recognizing this, the Commission necessarily must rely heavily on
both the accounting and legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and
responsibly. Breaches of professional responsibility jeopardize the achievement of the
objectives of the securities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors. 14
This rationale and similar views have been articulated by the SEC to justify
2(e) proceedings against accountants and other professionals. t 5 Similarly, courts
and commentators have often emphasized the importance of the accountant's
role in safeguarding the interests of investors and maintaining the integrity of the
disclosure process.1 6 As Judge Friendly noted, "[i]n our complex society the ac-
countant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."
t 7
The prevalence of this attitude has helped maintain the frequency of admin-
istrative proceedings and private damage actions against accountants. t 8 Ac-
countants, however, have achieved important victories in the battle to stem this
onslaught.t 9 The resistance by the accounting profession is perhaps best demon-
12 609 F.2d at 573.
13 d. at 582. See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeal, 270 U.S. 117, 122 (1926); SEC v. Csapo, 533
F.2d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Fields v. SEC, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.D.C. 1957), a'don o her grounds, 251 F.2d
919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 927 (1958); Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953); cf
Koden v. Department of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 1977) (Immigration and Naturalization
Service has authority to discipline attorneys practicing or appearing before it).
14 609 F.2d at 581. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973). Seegeneral45 United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
15 See, Ire Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,900, at
84,263 (1974) ("Professionals involved in the disclosure process are in a very real sense representatives of
the investing public. ... ); cf In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,991 (July 2, 1979) (Williams, C., concurring) (Commission would be unable to
effectively administer the federal securities laws without the aid of professionals of the highest integrity and
competence); n re Emanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,175
n.20 (June 18, 1973):
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character. He doesn't work in courtrooms
where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his office
where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents
that we, our staff, the financial community, and the investing public must take on faith.
16 See authorities cited in note 15 supra; SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 2.
17 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 863.
18 As Judge Timbers recently stated in a case involving an accounting firm: "This is another in a
series of cases which are occupying with increasing frequency the attention of the federal courts. They
involve the responsibility of certified public accountants in preparing and certifying financial statements."
Robertson v. Seidman & Siedman, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,100, at 96,055
(2d Cir. 1979). See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 281-82 n.191.
19 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private right of action
for damages under § 17(a) of the Exchange Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Oleck
UJune 19811
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strated by the Ninth Circuit's 1979 decision in SEC v. Arthur Young & Co. 20
In Arthur Young & Co., the SEC alleged that a national accounting firm and
certain of its individual members had violated the antifraud provisions of the
securities acts in connection with the audits of various false and misleading
financial statements.2 1 In arguing the standard by which liability should be
judged, the SEC contended that the court should determine whether the
financial statements in question, if properly audited, would have revealed to the
ordinary prudent investor the present or future risks that his investment would
bear.2 2 The court rejected this argument and instead adhered to the long settled
practice of applying generally accepted standards established by the accounting
profession. 23
The court stated that to accept the SEC's argument would render the ac-
countant a guarantor of his client's honesty and a policeman for the SEC.
2 4
Neither role, however, is within the proper function and responsibility of the ac-
countant. "The difficulty with. . . [the SEC's position] is that Congress has not
enacted the conscription bill that the SEC seeks to have us fashion and fix as an
interpretive gloss on existing securities laws." '2 5
Thus, while continuing to advocate the important role and responsibility of
the accountant, courts have been mindful of the need to avoid serious impair-
ment to the accounting profession. Justice Cardozo recognized this danger more
than 50 years ago in a case where a non-client third party attempted to impose
liability on an accounting firm for negligently certifying false and misleading
financial statements:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a
theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkin-
dle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences. 26
In a related area, courts in recent years have acknowledged the SEC's duty
to proceed with restraint in its administrative proceedings. In his concurring
opinion in Touche Ross, Judge Kaufman noted that courts will not tolerate ex-
cesses in such proceedings: "[I]n recognition that any power may be misused,
dispassionate panels of Article III judges stand ready to correct the occasional
excesses and errors that are an inevitable part of the administrative process." '27
Other courts recently have not been reluctant to limit the parameters of SEC
v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),afd, [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CH-) 1 97,525 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th
Cir. 1979); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
20 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
21 Id. at 786.
22 Id. at 787-88.
23 Id. at 788.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
27 609 F.2d at 583 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (citing Buchman v. SEC, 553 F.2d 816, 820 (2d Cir.
1977); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 183-
85 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978)).
[Vol. 56:820]
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administrative proceedings, 28 although many important questions remain un-
resolved.
III. Rule 2(e) Proceedings Against Entire Firms
A question which will undoubtedly soon receive increased judicial and ad-
ministrative attention is whether the Commission may (or should) discipline an
entire firm for the unlawful or improper conduct of only a few of its members.
The courts have already sounded a warning in this area in SEC civil actions by
questioning the appropriateness of enjoining an entire firm for the misconduct of
a few of its members.29 Until recently at least, the Commission's policy has been
to hold an entire accounting firm responsible in rule 2(e) proceedings for certified
financial statements based on an improper audit: "[W]e have consistently held
that where . . . a firm of public accountants permits a report or certificate to be
executed in its name, it will be held responsible therefor." 30
The Commission is not insensitive to this issue, however, and appears to
recognize that such a policy may have its limitations. In the 2(e) proceeding in
which it announced the policy, the Commission also noted that the firm involved
did not deny its responsibility for the alleged misconduct of the partners responsi-
ble for the questioned audits. 31 The Commission therefore found no need to de-
cide whether circumstances exist where it would be inappropriate to hold an
entire firm responsible, 32 and the Commission continues to discipline entire firms
on the basis of its stated policy.
33
In a recent 2(e) proceeding against an accounting firm, the Commission,
without expressly saying so, may have modified its policy. 34 Specifically, it
stated: "[T]he fact that a firm of public accountants permits a report or certifi-
cate to be executed in its name will be a factor in deciding whether to take action
against the firm for the conduct of its partners and employees or for the deficien-
cies in the audit."'35 The Commission went on to rationalize holding the firm
involved responsible since it viewed the misconduct as having been caused 6 y the
firm's failure to adopt, implement and maintain a quality control system which
would have ensured that its audits complied with generally accepted auditing
standards. 36 However, the Commission's statement regarding firms' responsibil-
28 See, e.g., cases cited in note 27 supra; Steadman v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999 (1981) (standard of proof in
SEC administrative proceedings).
29 See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1170-71 & nn.48 & 49 (D.C. Cir.),cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48 & nn.17 & 18 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 53-56 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682,
701 n.42 (D.D.C. 1978).
30 In re Ernst & Ernst, Accounting Series Release No. 248, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,270, at
62,733 & nn.67 & 68 (May 31, 1978) (citing In re Touche, Niven, Baily & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 676 n.65
(1957)). Accord, In re Lester Witte & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 285, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 1
72,307 (Jan. 7, 1981). See aso In re Touche Ross & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 153, 6 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 72,175 (Feb. 25, 1974).
31 In re Ernst & Ernst, Accounting Series Release No. 248, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,270, at
62,738 n.68 (May 31, 1978).
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., In re Kenneth Leventhal & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 288, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 72,310 (Feb. 26, 1981); In re Lester Witte & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 285, 6 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 72,307 (Jan. 7, 1981).
34 In re Lester Witte & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 285, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,307.
35 Id. at 62,866 (emphasis added).
36 Id.
[June 19811
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ity seems to be more than a restatement of existing policy: The policy appears to
have been modified so that the rendering of a report or certified opinion in a
firm's name will only be a factor in assessing whether the firm should be held
responsible for the misconduct of its members. Thus far, however, the Commis-
sion has neither confirmed nor denied the policy's modification, nor articulated
the "other factors" pertinent to the decision whether to hold a firm responsible.
These other factors may be developed on an ad hoc basis.
The Commission's apparent modification of its policy most likely stems from
doubts left by Touche Ross regarding the Commission's authority, and the proper
use of its authority, to discipline a firm for the transgressions of a few of its mem-
bers.3 7 The court in Touche Ross noted that an argument could be made that the
Commission may not proceed against a firm "on a theory of respondeat superior
without first establishing that Congress has delegated such authority and that the
Commission has, through a rulemaking proceeding, set the standards for such an
adjudication .... -3 In his concurring opinion, Judge Kaufman suggested that
sanctioning an entire firm for the transgressions of a few of its members could be
"unjustifiably extensive in scope."'39 Thus, the Second Circuit clearly warned the
SEC about proceedings and sanctions against entire firms, and the Commission
has apparently heeded the warning.
In a recent 2(e) proceeding against a law firm, the Commission carefully
distinguished the proceeding from one where an entire firm was "being held ac-
countable for knowledge or conduct of a few of its members." '40 Instead, the
Commission characterized the proceeding as one involving a firm whose mem-
bers had various contacts with and knowledge of the transactions giving rise to
the omitted disclosures under scrutiny, and which lacked an internal procedural
mechanism for collecting information in the possession of firm members for pur-
poses of preparing and reviewing public disclosure documents. 4 1 Accordingly,
the proceeding was based on the deficiencies in the firm rather than conduct of
particular firm members. A dissenting commissioner, in addition to launching a
wholesale attack on rule 2(e) and the Commission's authority under it,4 2 criti-
cized the notion of holding an entire firm responsible for the improper profes-
sional conduct of its individual members43 -a frequent basis for Commission
proceedings against accounting firms.44 The dissent's supporting rationale was
that "[e]thical and professional standards are peculiarly personal,"45 and there-
37 609 F.2d at 582 n.21 (majority opinion), 583 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 582 n.21 (citing Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 373
(1978)).
39 609 F.2d at 583 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
40 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEaC. L. REP. (CCH) V 82,124, at
81,988 (july 2, 1979).
41 Id. at 81,988-89.
42 Id. at 81,992-97 (Karmel, C., dissenting). Commissioner Karmel also expressed these views in her
dissent in In re Nielsen, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,446 (Jan. 10, 1980).
43 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 82,124, at
81,996-97 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, C., dissenting).
44 See, e.g., In re Kenneth Leventhal & Co., Accounting Series Release No. 288, 6 FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 72,310 (Feb. 26, 1981); In re Lester Witte & Co., Accounting Series Realese No. 285, 6 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 72,307 (Jan. 7, 1981).
45 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEac. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at
81,997-98 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, C., dissenting).
[Vol. 56:820]
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fore a firm should not be held responsible for violations of these standards by
individual firm members.
It is increasingly apparent that numerous arguments exist against the use of
2(e) proceedings and sanctions against entire firms for the misconduct of in-
dividual firm members. Because image and reputation are so vitally important
in the accounting profession, SEC disciplinary proceedings can have a serious
negative impact on a firm's business. Consequently, the appropriateness of disci-
plining entire firms is a question that should, and presumably will, receive care-
ful consideration. 4
6
IV. Standard of Proof in Rule 2(e) Proceedings
Until the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Steadman . SEC, 47 the lower
federal courts had split on the proper standard of proof in SEC administrative
proceedings. 48 Some courts had held that a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard applied, while others applied a clear and convincing proof standard.
49
Historically, the Commission applied the preponderance standard and
urged that it was appropriate in its administrative proceedings. 50 Collins Securities
Corp. V. SEC,5 ' in which the SEC sought disbarment from practice of a broker-
dealer accused of fraud, appears to have been the first case in which a court
addressed the appropriateness of this standard in SEC administrative proceed-
ings. The court there concluded that a clear and convincing standard applied.
52
In determining which standard should apply in Collins, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit looked to the nature of the
alleged offense-fraud-and the type of sanctions sought.53 Noting the SEC's
customary reliance on circumstantial proof to establish its cases, the seriousness of
the charge of fraud and the penal nature of a sanction such as disbarment from
practice, the court concluded that a clear and convincing standard should apply
46 One effect which 2(e) proceedings against accounting firms have had is to subject the firms to a
system of "peer review"-a process by which the firm's practices and procedures are reviewed by other
members of the accounting profession. Accounting firms have frequently agreed to such reviews in settle-
ment of 2(e) proceedings. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 281-82 n.191.
47 101 S. Ct. 999 (1981).
48 Compare Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (clear and convincing standard
applies when fraud allegations and disbarment of a professional from practice are at issue) and Whitney v.
SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (clear and convincing standard applies in case involving a nine month
suspension of broker-dealer based on fraud) wi/h Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979) (prepon-
derance of the evidence standard applies in case involving fraud allegations and permanent disbarment
from association with investment advisor), af'd, 101 S. Ct. 999 (1981) and Investors Research Corp. v. SEC,
628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 317 (1980) (clear and convincing standard not applicable in
administrative proceeding wherein finding of fraud was not required and no severe sanction was imposed).
Cf. Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (preponderance of the evidence rather than "substan-
tial evidence" standard applies in FTC disciplinary proceeding against attorney); Sea Island Broadcasting
Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 105 (1980) (clear and convincing standard
applies in certain FCC license revocation proceedings involving an issue of fraud).
49 See cases cited in note 48 supra.
50 See Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Cea, 44 S.E.C. 8, 25 (1969); In re
Pollisky, 43 S.E.C. 458, 459-60 (1967); In re Mammos, 43 S.E.C. 333, 337 (1967), aJ'dmem., (2d Cir. 1967);
In re Harris, Clare & Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8004 (1966); In re Underhill Sec.
Corp., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 7668 (Aug. 3, 1965) [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,270; In re White, 3 S.E.C. 466, 539-40 (1938).
51 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52 Id. at 826.
53 Id. at 824.
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to provide a measure of protection for the accused. 5 4 The court reached this
conclusion despite the SEC's strenuous argument that broker-dealer administra-
tive proceedings are remedial, not penal.55
Collins expressly left open the question whether a lesser standard of proof
would apply in proceedings other than those alleging fraud or resulting in the
severe sanction of deprivation of livelihood.5 6 The same court partly answered
this question in Whitney v. SEC,57 holding that "any sanction imposed under sec-
tion 15(b) [administrative proceedings] which depends on a finding of fraud must
be sustained by clear and convincing evidence." 58 The court so concluded de-
spite the lighter sanction imposed in Whilney-a nine month suspension of a bro-
ker-dealer-and the direct (as opposed to circumstantial) evidence present in the
proceeding. 59 Whitney did not, however, decide the other question left open in
Collins-whether a lesser standard would apply in a proceeding imposing sanc-
tions on the basis of conduct other than fraud.
In Investors Research Corp. v. SEC,6 0 the District of Columbia Circuit partly
answered this question. Specifically, the court concluded that the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard applied in SEC administrative proceedings not
based on fraud and not seeking to impose severe sanctions.6 1 Still unclear, how-
ever, was whether the imposition of severe sanctions on the basis of conduct other
than fraud would necessitate the higher standard of proof. Whitney decided that
any sanction based on fraud dictated the higher standard, while Investors Research
concluded that the lower standard applied where neither fraud nor severe sanc-
tions were present. Accordingly, the question whether the higher standard would
apply in a proceeding involving severe sanctions on the basis of conduct other
than fraud was unanswered. Since proceedings against accountants frequently
are based on improper professional conduct rather than fraud, this issue would
have significant consequences for the accounting profession. 62
The importance of this question recently faded, however, when the Supreme
Court finally resolved the standard of proof issue in Steadman v. SEC.63 The Fifth
Circuit had held in Steadman that violations of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in SEC disci-
plinary proceedings. 64 As a counterbalance to the harshness of adverse findings
and sanctions in such proceedings, the court pointed to the power of the courts to
set aside arbitrary and capricious SEC orders, 65 and concluded that the more
serious the sanction imposed by the Commission, the greater its obligation will be
"to explain why a less drastic remedy would not suffice." 66
In concluding that a preponderance of the evidence standard applied, the
54 Id. at 824-26.
55 Id. at 825-26.
56 Id. at 825 n.32.
57 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
58 Id. at 681.
59 Id.
60 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 317 (1980).
61 628 F.2d at 175 n.41.
62 See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
63 101 S. Ct. 999 (1981).
64 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979).
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Supreme Court ielied on the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA) rather
than on the nature of the charges or the seriousness of the sanctions involved.6 7
The Court noted that while judicial review of SEC disciplinary proceedings is
dealt with expressly in the securities laws, the standard of proof governing adju-
dications in such proceedings is not.68 Accordingly, the Court turned to the APA
which "applies. . . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be deter-
mined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," except in certain
circumstances not relevant in Seadman.69 On the basis of the express language of
the applicable provisions of the APA and the legislative history of these provi-
sions, the Court concluded that the preponderance standard was appropriate. 70
It is important to note that the disciplinary proceeding involved in Steadman
was brought pursuant to section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act (the ICA)
and section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act, expressly empowering the
Commission, in specified circumstances, to impose sanctions, after notice and op-
portunity for hearing, on certain persons associated with investment companies
or investment advisers. 7 1 The proceeding was not based on rule 2(e), which the
Commission promulgated pursuant to its general rulemaking power rather than
to any specific statutory authority. As discussed in the next section, an aspect of
the court of appeals' decision in Steadman not considered by the Supreme Court
may foreshadow a significant limitation on SEC proceedings against accountants
and other professionals under rule 2(e).
V. Conduct Within Rule 2(e)
As noted earlier, 72 the express language of rule 2(e) empowers the Commis-
sion to discipline an accountant or other professional, after notice and a hearing,
on the basis of a finding that such person willfully violated or willfully aided and
abetted violations of the federal securities laws.73 The rule further permits the
Commission, without a hearing, to temporarily suspend a person from appearing
or practicing before it if such person has been permanently enjoined in a Com-
mission action from violating, or aiding and abetting violations of, the securities
laws, or found by a court in a Commission action, or by the Commission in an
administrative proceeding, to have violated or aided and abetted violations of the
securities laws. 74 If the person suspended does not petition the Commission for a
hearing within thirty days to lift the suspension, it becomes permanent.75
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Steadman, which was affirmed by the Supreme
67 101 S. Ct. at 1004-06.
68 Id. at 1005.
69 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554).
70 101 S. Ct. at 1008; Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1976).
71 101 S. Ct. at 1003 & nn.1 & 2.
72 See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
73 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1980).
74 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1980). Rule 2(e)(2) further provides for an automatic suspension from
appearance or practice before the Commission by a person who: (a) has been suspended or disbarred from
practice or whose license has been revoked by a state licensing authority; (b) has been convicted of a
felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; or (c) has been suspended or disbarred by a court
of competent jurisdiction. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(2) (1980). See Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24,
1970) [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,913.
75 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii) (1980). If the subject of the temporary suspension timely petitions the
Commission to lift it, the Commission must either lift the suspension or set the matter down for an expedi-
tious hearing. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(iii) (1980).
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Court only on the question of the proper standard of proof,76 casts serious doubt
on whether the Commission may proceed under rule 2(e) for violations of, or for
the aiding and abetting of violations of, the securities laws. In Steadman, the Fifth
Circuit was troubled by the Commission's position that it could consider viola-
tions of section 36(a) of the ICA, which does not expressly empower the Commis-
sion to proceed administratively, in assessing sanctions in an administrative
proceeding expressly authorized by other statutory provisions. 77 Unlike the two
statutory provisions under which the Commission sought to impose the sanctions
in Steadman-which, as stated earlier, expressly empower the Commission to ad-
ministratively discipline certain persons associated with investment companies
and investment advisers7 -- section 36(a) of the ICA only authorizes the Commis-
sion to proceed in federal district court for violations of its provisions. 79 As the
Fifth Circuit noted, section 36(a) does not authorize administrative disciplinary
proceedings:
Section 36(a) permits the Commission to apply to a federal district court for an in-
junction against an officer of an investment adviser who has engaged or is about to
engage in acts constituting "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal miscon-
duct." It gives no power to the Commission, an administrative agency, to adjudicate such
breaches, and the Commission has held that it cannot do so. 8 °
Since the jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act of 1 9 3 3 81 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 193482 similarly limit to injunctive relief the Commis-
76 101 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
77 603 F.2d at 1141.
78 See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
79 Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act provides:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of the United
States, or in the United States court of any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, alleging that a person serving or acting in one or more of the following
capacities has engaged within five years of the commencement of the action or is about to
engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving misconduct in
respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or acts.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976).
The jurisdictional provisions of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act similarly limit the
authority of the Commission to prosecute violations of the respective acts in civil courts. See Securities Act,
§ 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Exchange Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
80 603 F.2d at 1141 (citing In re Shipley, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,833 (June 21, 1974) (emphasis added).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (1976). Section 20(b) of the Securities Act provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage
in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, it may in its discre-
tion, bring an action in any district court of the United States or United States court of any
Territory, to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or tempo-
rary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may trans-
mit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General
who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this subchapter.
Any such criminal proceeding may be brought either in the district wherein the transmittal of
the prospectus or security complained of begins, or in the district wherein such prospectus or
security is received.
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976).
82 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-I (1976). Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any Territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have excusivejurisdiction of viola-
tions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any
act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability
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sion's authority to redress violations of their provisions, it is arguable after
Steadman that the Commission may not proceed administratively against ac-
countants or other professionals under rule 2(e) for violations of the securities acts
despite the rule's express language.83 The limitation on 2(e) implied by Steadman
seems more plausible in light of the numerous provisions in the securities acts
expressly providing for administrative proceedings under various circumstances,
none of which expressly deals with violations committed by accountants or other
professionals while providing their services. 84 Following the court of appeals'
logic in Steadman, the Commission should not be able to proceed under rule 2(e)
for violations of the securities laws since the "responsibility for . . . [their] en-
forcement is vested in the courts, not the Commission. '"85
A similar argument was advanced by former SEC Commissioner Karmel in
1979 in a rule 2(e) proceeding against a law firm.8 6 Arguing that the securities
laws do not expressly grant the Commission authority to discipline attorneys,
Commissioner Karmel objected to using rule 2(e) to discipline attorneys for any
purpose other than protecting the integrity or processes of the Commission. 87
Acknowledging that a government agency may have the need to discipline pro-
fessionals practicing before it "in order to keep its proceedings orderly and digni-
fied," 88 Commissioner Karmel nevertheless was highly critical of using an
implied power such as rule 2(e) for any other purpose. Thus, in her view, any
sanctions which the Commission believes are appropriate to protect itself and the
public from conduct of professionals which does not directly interfere with the
or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of
such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as
provided in sections 1254, 1291 and 1292 of Title 28. No costs shall be assessed for or against
the Commission in any proceeding under this chapter brought by or against it in the Supreme
Court or such other courts.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (emphasis added).
83 See 603 F.2d at 1141 n.21, where the Fifth Circuit referred to any attempt by the Commission to
proceed administratively on the basis of violations of § 36(a) as a poaching "on the jurisdiction entrusted
solely to a federal district court."
84 There are a variety of provisions in the securities acts and the rules and regulations thereunder
which the SEC may utilize to institute administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Securities Act, § 8(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77h(b) (Commission may issue an order, after notice and hearing, refusing to permit a registra-
tion statement to become effective until it has been amended in accordance with the order); Securities Act,
§ 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (Commission may issue a stop order, after notice and hearing, suspending the
effectiveness of a registration statement); rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e) (1980) (Commission may suspend, temporarily or permanently, after notice and hearing, profes-
sionals from practicing or appearing before it). See also Exchange Act, §§ 1 1(b), 15(b), 15(c), 19(h), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78k(b), 78o (b), 78o (c), 78s(h), and the rules and regulations thereunder. See Mathews, Litigation
and Settlement of SEC Administrative Proceedings, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 215 (1980); Thomforde, Negotiating
Administrative Settlements in SEC Broker-Dealer Displinag
, 
Proceedings, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237 (1977). Section
15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act is frequently utilized as a vehicle for instituting SEC administrative proceed-
ings. See, e.g., In re Florida Power Corp., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,127 (Sept. 8,
1980) [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,654; In re AES Technology Syss., Inc., Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,126 (Sept. 5, 1980); In re Playboy Enterprises, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 17,059 (Aug. 13, 1980) [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 82,635; In re Spartek, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979)
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,961.
85 603 F.2d at 1142 (referring to § 36(a) of the ICA).
86 In re Keating, Muething & Klakamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,124
(July 2, 1979) (Karmel, C., dissenting).
87 Id. at 81,994.
88 Id.
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Commission's integrity or processes should be sought in federal court, not in rule
2(e) proceedings. 8 9
While Commissioner Karmel expressed the belief that the Commission
might have broader disciplinary authority over accountants because of its express
statutory authority to regulate financial statement presentation and indepen-
dence requirements of accountants, 90 she echoed the same concerns about pro-
ceedings against accountants where the alleged misconduct does not directly
interfere with the Commission's integrity or processes. 9' In a 1980 rule 2(e) pro-
ceeding against an accountant, Commissioner Karmel stated: "In my opinion,
some direct connection between the accountant's improper conduct and the
Commission's express regulatory authority must be demonstrated before an im-
plied statutory sanction like Rule 2(e) can be invoked with respect to an account-
ant."' 92 According to Commissioner Karmel, the Commission does not, however,
have the statutory authority to discipline an accountant solely because he has
violated the securities laws.93
Although this view may be appealing, it is not without opposition both from
within the Commission and in the courts. In the same rule 2(e) proceeding in
which Commissioner Karmel launched her attack on the rule, then Chairman
Williams wrote a concurring opinion in an attempt to soften Commissioner
Karmel's strongly worded dissent. 94 Specifically, Chairman Williams stated that
the Commission had both the inherent and statutory authority to promulgate the
rule.95 Moreover, the rule was designed and is used "to protect the integrity of
[the Commission's] processes from incompetent, unethical or dishonest profes-
sionals." 96
Buttressing his arguments, Chairman Williams pointed to the Second Cir-
cuit's 1979 decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC97 which sustained the validity of
the rule and the Commission's authority to promulgate it.98 In Touche Ross, the
court expressly rejected the argument that through use of the rule the Commis-
sion is "attempting to usurp the jurisdiction of the federal courts to deal with
'violations' of the securities laws." 99 Instead, the court viewed the Commission's
89 Id. at 81,996-97; See In re Nielsen, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,446,
at 82,886 (Jan. 10, 1980).
90 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at
81,993 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, C., dissenting); In re Nielsen, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,446, at 82,884 (Jan. 10, 1980) (Karmel, C., dissenting).
91 Id. at 82,886.
92 Id. at 82,885.
93 Id.
94 In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,124, at
81,989 (July 2, 1979) (Williams, C., concurring specially).
95 As Chairman Williams stated:
The rule was promulgated not only pursuant to the Commission's inherent authority, but as an
exercise of the broad, express rulemaking power which Congress, in reliance upon the ability of
an expert agency to fashion necessary or appropriate regulations in a complex and rapidly
changing area, conferred in Section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Since that time, the
Commission has periodically amended and reexamined the rule, repeatedly confirming its belief
in the rule's legitimacy. Moreover, the Commission has brought over 100 proceedings against
accountants since the inception of the rule.
Id. at 81,990 (footnote omitted).
96 Id.
97 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
98 Id. at 582.
99 Id. at 579.
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use of the rule as an attempt "to preserve the integrity of its own procedures, by
assuring the fitness of those professionals who represent others before the Com-
mission."10 0 Such reasoning could overcome the limitation on SEC administra-
tive proceedings suggested by the court in Steadman.
Interestingly, in reaching its conclusion about the Commission's use of rule
2(e), the Second Circuit pointed to the Commission's admitted policy of using the
rule as a means of determining professional qualifications, not as an additional
weapon in its enforcement arsenal. 0 t Although determining professional qualifi-
cations certainly could be construed to include examining conduct which violates
the federal securities laws, it is also susceptible to a narrower construction, espe-
cially in the context in which it was used. Thus, whether the Second Circuit's
decision in Touche Ross rebuts the limitation suggested by the Fifth Circuit in
Steadman is open to debate.
At this stage, serious questions have been raised by the courts and members
of the Commission regarding the scope of the Commission's authority under rule
2(e). Apparently, resolution will come not from express statutory language or
congressional history, but from a policy decision by the courts.
VI. Culpability Standards in Rule 2(e) Proceedings
At least two of the express bases upon which the Commission may discipline
professionals under rule 2(e) involve the issue of the state of mind necessary to
establish violations of the rule. '0 2 "Unethical or improper professional conduct,"
or willful violations or the willful aiding and abetting of violations of the federal
securities laws, may support temporarily or permanently suspending a profes-
sional from practicing or appearing before the Commission. ' 0 3 The language of
these provisions raises several questions regarding the applicable culpability stan-
dards. The controversial 2(e) proceeding in In re Carter &Johnson 104 recently ad-
dressed some of these questions.
In Carter &Johnson, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that two law-
yers associated with the same law firm' 0 5 had, in their representation of a report-
ing company client, violated the federal securities laws and engaged in unethical
and improper professional conduct in connection with the preparation of alleg-
edly false and misleading letters to stockholders, a press release, and an 8-K Re-
port filed with the SEC. 106 The ALJ held that the lawyers both willfully violated
and aided and abetted violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the
100 Id.
101 Id. The court cited Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970), supra note 74, where the
Commission explained the 1970 amendment to the rule, see note 7 supra, as follows:
The latter aspect of the revision is merely a clarification of Commission practice under the
present Rule 2(e), which provides for the disqualification from appearance or practice before
the Commission of any person who the Commission finds after notice of and opportunity for
hearing (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.
Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970), supra note 75, at 80,033.
102 See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
103 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1980).
104 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
105 Interestingly, the Commission did not proceed against the entire law firm for the alleged miscon-
duct of the two individual partners. See notes 29-46 and accompanying text supra.
106 In re Carter &Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 (Mar. 7, 1979),
rev'd, [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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Exchange Act.' 0 7 No findings were made regarding the lawyers' states of mind
in engaging in unethical and improper professional conduct. The lawyers ap-
pealed the ALJ's decision to the Commission which reversed on all counts. 108
The Commission summarily reversed the ALJ's findings of primary securi-
ties law violations on the grounds that (1) the lawyers were not "issuers" and
therefore could not have directly violated the reporting provision allegedly vio-
lated (which applies to issuers), and (2) the lawyers' involvement in the decision-
making processes of the reporting company client was insufficient to justify a
finding that they had directly violated the antifraud provisions.10 9 The Commis-
sion also reversed the ALJ's findings regarding aiding and abetting. It found
insufficient evidence to establish that the respondents had acted with sufficient
knowledge and awareness or recklessness to satisfy the test for willful aiding and
abetting. ' 10
In reversing the ALJ on the aiding and abetting charge, the Commission
engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning the state of mind necessary to estab-
lish aiding and abetting liability in rule 2(e) proceedings. I II Although it is not
absolutely clear from the opinion, the Commission appears to have adopted the
standards applicable in civil securities cases. ' 12 This marks, or at least suggests, a
departure from past SEC pronouncements regarding culpability, since the Com-
mission earlier expressly rejected the applicability of the civil culpability stan-
dards in its administrative proceedings.
In Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC," 3 the Commission argued that the scienter
requirement established by the Supreme Court in Enst &Ernst v. Hochfelder 1 ' 4 for
private damage actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act
does not apply in SEC administrative proceedings brought under section 15 of
107 The lawyers were found to have violated §§ 10(b) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act and rules 10b-5,
12b-20 and 13a- 1l thereunder. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,175 at 82,180.
108 In re Carter & Johnson, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847 at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
109 Id. at 84,165.
110 Id. at 84,165-67. The ALJ's findings regarding unethical and improper professional conduct were
reversed on the grounds that generally accepted standards of professional conduct had not been adopted
or endorsed by the Commission or unambiguously developed during the period of the lawyers' activities.
Id. at 84,173. The Commission continued, for purpose of future cases, to give its interpretation of"unethi-
cal or improper professional conduct" under rule 2(e), and added that it intended to solicit public com-
ment on that interpretation. Id. at 84,169-73.
111 Id. at 84,165-69. On the basis of its review of existing case law dealing with civil suits under the
securities acts, the Commission, in its discussion of aiding and abetting under § 10(b), found the following
to be the necessary elements to establish aiding and abetting liability:
1. there exists an independent securities law violation committed by some other party;
2. the aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the conduct that constitutes the
violation; and
3. the aider and abettor was aware or knew that his role was part of an activity that was
improper or illegal.
Id. at 84,166 (citing SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Investors Research
Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 317 (1980); International Inv.
Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1978); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir.
1975); SEC v. Coffee, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974); Landy v. F.D.I.C., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d
Cir.), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)).
112 See cases cited in note I IIsupra.
113 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976),cert denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
114 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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the Exchange Act charging fraud against broker-dealers. 1 5 In Hochfe/der, the
Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud."1 1 6 In Arthur Lobper Corp., however, the Commission argued
against imposing this culpability standard in its administrative proceedings."17
According to the Commission, the state of mind requirement in such proceedings
is governed by the term "willfully" as used in section 15 of the Exchange Act,
and presumably also as used in rule 2(e), I t8 and this term simply requires proof
that the respondent acted with awareness of the consequences of his conduct."i9
This standard seems only to require a conscious awareness of one's actions, while
the Hochfelder standard-which embraces an intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud-seems to require some element of evil or wrongful intent.'20 Obviously,
the Commission's interpretation of "willful" in the context of its administrative
proceedings is less stringent than the Supreme Court's interpretation of "scien-
ter" in the context of civil damage actions. The issue in either case, however, is
the same: Did the respondent or defendant violate or aid and abet violations of
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws? The court of appeals in Arthur
Lz'per Corp. did not reach a conclusion on the issue.'12
In Carter &Johnson, the ALJ applied the Commission's interpretation of
"willfulness" in determining whether the accused lawyers violated or aided and
abetted violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.12 2 In doing so, the ALJ
noted that "the Commission has held Hochfelder to be inapplicable to its adminis-
trative proceedings."'' 2 3 In reversing the ALJ, however, the Commission made
no reference to its prior pronouncements or the ALJ's adoption of the willfulness
standard in administrative proceedings. Instead, the Commission eliminated the
need to consider this issue by finding insufficient evidence to establish the re-
quired knowledge and awareness necessary for secondary liability under section
115 547 F.2d at 180.
116 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
117 547 F.2d at 180; see Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
118 See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
119 547 F.2d at 180. The court in Arthur Lipper noted that this interpretation of the "willfulness" re-
quirement "has been accorded judicial acceptance." Id. at 180 ("It has been uniformly held that 'willfully'
in this context means intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation. There is no re-
quirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.") (footnote omitted)
(citing Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965)).
120 See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfetder and Aaron, 8 SEc. REG. L.J.
179, 191-94 (1980).
121 The court stated:
The Court left open [in Hochfelder] "the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an
action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." 425 U.S. at 194 n.12, 96 S. Ct. at
1381. The Court said nothing about whether scienter is a necessary element in disciplinary
actions under § 15 [against broker-dealers in securities]. These actions share with damage suits
the quality of visiting serious consequences on past conduct, even though they also have a reme-
dial effect. They thus differ from injunctive proceedings, the objective of which is solely to
prevent threatened future harm, although unlawful conduct is necessary-if not always suffli-
cient-to demonstrate the reality of this threat. We therefore assume, arguendo, without decid-
ing, that the Hochfelder culpability standard applies in disciplinary proceedings.
547 F.2d at 180-81 n.6.
122 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175, at 82,180 (Mar. 7, 1979), reo'd, [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
123 Id. (citing FAI Inv. Analysis, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 14,288 (Dec. 19,
1977); Steadman Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 13,695 (June 29, 1977) [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,243; and Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171,
180 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978)).
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10(b).12 4
Since much of the Commission's Carter &Johnson opinion suggests, perhaps
somewhat obliquely, that the Hochfelder scienter requirement should apply in
SEC administrative proceedings, further examination of the issue seems likely.
In addition, although no court has yet decided the issue, the judicial precedents
suggest the Hochfelder requirement applies in administrative proceedings.1 25
In reversing the ALJ on the aiding and abetting charge, the Commission
stated: "[W]e do hold, however, that a finding of willful aiding and abetting within
the meaning of Rule 2(e)(1) (iii) requires a showing that respondents were aware
or knew that their role was part of an activity that was improper or illegal."
1 26
One element required to establish aiding and abetting liability is a "wrongful
intent" on the part of the respondent. 127 In addition, the Commission stated that
in aiding and abetting proceedings involving active participation by the respon-
dent in conduct furthering the primary violation, the evidence must establish
that the "respondent acted with sufficient knowledge and awareness or reckless-
ness to satisfy the test for willful aiding and abetting liability." 128 To establish
aiding and abetting liability in cases involving silence or inaction rather than
active conduct, the respondent must be found to have "consciously intended to
assist. . . the primary violation, or. . . [to have] breached a duty to disclose or
act and had some degree of scienter."' 129 This "test requires a showing that...
[the respondent] 'intended' to foster the illegal activity."' 3 0
Each of the Commission's references to state of mind resembled scienter as
defined in Hochfelder. Mere awareness of the act done, the standard previously
advocated by the Commission, 13 1 would appear insufficient in light of the stan-
dards articulated in Carter &Johnson. Whether the Commission will adhere to
these standards in future cases, however, is subject to some doubt.13 2
124 See notes 110-111 and accompanying text supra.
125 See notes 132-142 and accompanying text infia.
126 In re Carter &Johnson, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,167.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 84,169.
130 Id.
131 See notes 115-123 and accompanying text supra.
132 On March 20, 1981, the staff of the SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification with
the Commission with respect to various aspects of the Carter &Johnson decision dealing with the state of
mind requirement. See SEC Administrative Proc. File No. 3-5464 (Mar. 20, 1981). Several of the staff's
suggested clarifications and modifications would restrict the Commission's broad language concerning
state of mind.
In addition, it bears emphasis that the Commission's discussion of the state of mind requirement was
limited to aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5. The Carter &
Johnson decision did not address this issue in the context of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act. See Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (scienter required under § 17(a)(1) but not §§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securi-
ties Act in SEC injunctive suits). Also, the Commission or its staff may argue that the state of mind
standards articulated in Carter &Johnson only apply in § 10(b) aiding and abetting proceedings, where the
respondent, being somewhat removed from the primary violation, must be shown to have intentionally
assisted or furthered the primary wrong in some manner, and that such intent is not necessary where the
respondent is himself charged with a primary violation. While there may be circumstances where such a
distinction has appeal, it seems axiomatic that if the primary violator must have acted with scienter to be
liable under § 10(b), so too must have the aider and abettor. Of course in some respects this begs the
argument made by the Commission about its interpretation of "willfulness" in the context of administra-
tive proceedings. See notes 115-124 and accompanying text supra. Nonetheless, as discussed in the text
infra, it is unlikely that the courts would distinguish between the culpability standard applicable in admin-
istrative proceedings and civil suits since the statutory language and apparent congressional intent of
§ 10(b) dictate the scienter requirement, and thus the forum in which the violation is claimed should have
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Judicial precedents suggest that the Commission should abide by the stan-
dards applicable in civil suits. The Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder that
scienter must be proved in private damage actions under section 10(b) was based
not on the policy objectives to be achieved by enforcement of the statute, but
instead on the section's language and apparent congressional intent.' 33 Simi-
larly, the Court's more recent decision in Aaron . SEC, 34 in which proof of scien-
ter was held to be required in SEC injunctive suits brought under section
10(b),1 35 was buttressed by the same analysis of express statutory language and
apparent congressional intent.' 3 6 Thus, in analyzing section 10(b)'s culpability
requirement the Court was indifferent to whether the plaintiff was the SEC or a
private litigant or whether injunctive or monetary relief was sought. Instead, the
crucial inquiry concerned statutory language and congressional intent.
Under the Hochfelder and Aaron analysis, it is doubtful that the Commission
would prevail in arguing that a lesser requirement applies in rule 2(e) or other
SEC administrative proceedings alleging section 10(b) violations. '37 Instead, the
language of section 10(b), which itself dictates a scienter requirement, would be
controlling. For example, the Commission argued before the court of appeals in
Steadman v. SEC 38 that proof of scienter was not required in administrative pro-
ceedings brought under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act.' 39 The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument, holding that on the basis of that section's language
and the analytical approach mandated by Hochfelder, scienter was a necessary
element of a section 17(a)(1) violation in SEC administrative proceedings. 140
Neither the forum in which the charges were brought nor the severity of the
sanctions sought made a difference to the Fifth Circuit in deciding the basic ele-
ments of a violation of the statute. 41 Rather, the language of the statute con-
trolled. Other courts that have commented on the issue have shown a similar
inclination.1 42 Thus, it is entirely likely that the Commission will be required to
no bearing on the culpability requirement under the section. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
133 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly understood
terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are
quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." Id. at 214.
134 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
135 Id. at 697.
136 Id. at 689-95.
137 A question left open in both Hochfelder and Aaron is whether "reckless" conduct is sufficient to
impose liability under § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 193 n.12; 446 U.S. at 686 n.5. "While the overwhelming
majority of lower courts since Hochfelder have agreed that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement,
they have split deeply on the meaning of the term." Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness"
After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179, 181 & n.7 (1980).
138 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979). See notes 63-85 and accompanying text supra.
139 603 F.2d at 1131-33. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided that scienter was required in SEC
injunctive suits based on § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, but not under §§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
140 603 F.2d at 1133. This aspect of Steadman was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. See notes 63-85
and accompanying text supra.
141 603 F.2d at 1133.
142 See, e.g., Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 176-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
317 (1980); Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 682 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("We have no occasion to decide the
relevance of Iochfelder to this case. Section 15(b) [of the Exchange Act] by its terms requires that a person
have 'willfully' violated the securities laws, . . . and we think 'willfullness' in this sense is more or less
congruent with Hochfelder s use of 'scienter' "); Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 826-27 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Butsee Nassar & Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 790, 794-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring). See
[June 19811
RULE 2(E) AND ACCOUNTANTS
adopt the scienter requirement in its administrative proceedings.
Conclusion
The SEC's aggressive use of rule 2(e) proceedings against accountants and
other professionals in recent years has brought into focus several important issues
concerning such proceedings. Although the Commission has been successful in
dealing with some of these issues, it is evident that the breadth of SEC adminis-
trative proceedings and the latitude with which the Commission may proceed
under them are being narrowed. Consequently, the Commission's ability to dis-
cipline members of the accounting and other professions in the future may well
be curtailed.
general/( Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Adminzrtrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U.L. REV.
215 (1979).
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